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CASENOTES
How Much Immunity for International
Organizations?: Mendaro v. World Bank
Employees of international organizations headquartered in the
United States may find themselves remediless against abuse by their
employers, unless their organization has an effective internal admin-
istrative tribunal. Recently, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Mendaro v. World Bank' found the World Bank, 2
as an international organization, immune from suit by an employee
alleging sexual harassment, despite the conspicuous absence of an
effective grievance procedure within the Bank. 3 The court reasoned
that employment relations were within the grant of immunity con-
templated by Congress in the International Organizations Immuni-
ties Act (IOIA). 4 The court failed, however, to acknowledge the
conditional nature of international organizations immunity.
The IOIA grants international organizations headquartered in
the United States immunity from American municipal law for their
official, noncommercial activities. 5 While international organizations
traditionally have enjoyed immunity, 6 the State Department consid-
ers this immunity a privilege of national law that imposes a special
obligation on international organizations to provide effective meth-
ods of addressing labor-management disputes. 7 When faced with an
action brought by an employee against an international organization,
1 717 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
2 The World Bank is an international financial institution that promotes private for-
eign investment and long-range balanced growth in international trade. It was established
by Articles of Agreement which came into force December 27, 1945. 60 Stat. 1440,
T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2 U.N.T.S. 134.
3 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 612.
4 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1982). For a discussion of the Act, see Preuss, The International
Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332 (1946).
5 Id. The broad purpose of the statute is to vitalize the status of international orga-
nizations of which the United States is a member and to facilitate their activities. Interna-
tional Refugee Org. v. Republic of S.S. Corp., 189 F.2d 858, 860 (4th Cir. 1951), citing
Balfour, Guthrie & Co. v. United States, 90 F. Supp. 831, 833 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
6 Article 105 of the United Nations Charter grants the United Nations complete im-
munity from all legal process. See L. GOODRICH, E. HAMBRO & A. SIMONS, CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: COMMENTARY AND DOCUMENTS 617 (3d ed. 1969).
7 DEPARTMENT OF STATE DIGEST OF PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, Ch. 2, § 4B
(1979) [hereinafter cited as PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.]
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a court must delineate the reasonable scope of immunity, by refer-
ring to the IOIA and its legislative history, as well as to applicable
treaties or organizational charters.
The Mendaro court had the opportunity to define this scope
when Susana Mendaro, an Argentine citizen employed at the World
Bank, alleged a pattern of sexual harassment and discrimination
against her.8 Mendaro filed suit with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), alleging violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 The EEOC area office dismissed the com-
plaint for lack ofjurisdiction, finding the World Bank immune as an
international organization. 10
Mendaro then filed suit against the World Bank in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit.'' The
World Bank moved to dismiss the action, claiming immunity from
the jurisdiction of member nations in suits arising out of the Bank's
internal administrative affairs.' 2 While conceding that challenged
activities of the Bank normally would be immune from judicial scru-
tiny, Mendaro opposed the action, arguing that the Articles of
Agreement (the World Bank Charter) effectively waived the Bank's
right to claim the immunities of an international organization.' 3
The district court rejected Mendaro's interpretation of article
VII, section 3, which waives the Bank's immunity in specified cases. 14
Relying on Broadbent v. Organization of American States15 and the lan-
guage of the World Bank Charter, the district court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction.' 6 Mendaro appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,' 7 which
believed that the correctness of the district court decision depended
on the extent of the World Bank's immunity from suit under the
IOIA. 18
Mendaro argued that while the World Bank clearly possesses the
immunity granted to international organizations, its Charter contains
an effective waiver of immunity from judicial process by stipulating
8 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 612.
9 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982). 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)-(g) (1984) contains the enacted
guidelines that make sexual harassment on the job actionable.
10 Article VII, § 3 of the Articles of Agreement permits actions to be brought against
the World Bank "in a court of competent jurisdiction in the territories of a member in
which the Bank has an office, has appointed an agent for the purpose of accepting service
or notice of process, or has issued or guaranteed securities." 60 Stat. 1457, 2 U.N.T.S.
180.
11 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 613.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
16 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 613.
17 Id.
I8 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1982).
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the conditions under which actions may be brought against the
Bank.' 9 Furthermore, because this waiver is subject to two clearly
expressed exceptions, 20 the Charter implies that there are no other
restrictions on the waiver of immunity. Thus, the Charter affirma-
tively waives the Bank's immunity to all other types of suits, includ-
ing those brought by its employees. 2'
Mendaro relied on an earlier decision of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit in which the waiver provision in the Articles of Agreement
of the Inter-American Development Bank was interpreted broadly to
allow suits by debtors as well as by bondholders, creditors, and bene-
ficiaries of creditors. 22 Mendaro argued that this generous construc-
tion should be used in interpreting the World Bank's Charter to
allow suits against the World Bank by employees. 23
The court, however, rejected this argument, concluding that the
argument would be logical only if no reference were made to the
interrelationship between the functions of the Bank and the pur-
poses underlying international organizations immunities. 24 The
function of the Bank is to provide coordinated multinational action
in promoting development and balanced growth in international
trade.25 The purpose of international immunities is to free organiza-
tions such as the World Bank from the peculiarities of national poli-
tics by immunizing them from legal process, financial controls, taxes,
and duties.26
Some immunities are waived by charter when an insistence on
immunity would prevent or hinder an organization from conducting
its activities. 27 The Mendaro court, however, found that immunity
from suits by employees in actions arising out of the employment
relationship is one of the most important protections against the pe-
culiarities of national politics. 28 The court noted that if an interna-
tional organization were expected to adhere to all of the employment
practices of its member organizations, administrative havoc would
19 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 614. 22 U.S.C. § 288a(b) codifies the ability of an interna-
tional organization to expressly waive immunity.
20 These exceptions are: (1) suits by the members of the Bank, and (2) actions seek-
ing prejudgment attachment of the Bank's assets. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 614.
21 Id.
22 Lutcher S.A. Celulose e Papel v. Inter-American Dev. Bank, 382 F.2d 454 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) (lower court granted jurisdiction but dismissed case for failure to state cause of
action; dismissal affirmed on appeal).
23 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 614.
24 Id. at 615.
25 Id.
26 RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (revised)
§ 464(1) (Tentative Draft No. 4) (1983).
27 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615.
28 Id. The court also noted that the immunity is now an accepted doctrine of custom-
ary international law. See A. PLANTEY, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE §§ 133-35
(1981); but see M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 118 (4th ed.
1982).
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ensue, impairing the functioning of the organization.2 9
Conceding that the World Bank could have chosen to waive im-
munity expressly, 30 the court refused to read such a waiver into the
World Bank Charter. Relinquishment of immunity arguably would
not give any benefit to the Bank. The court stated that "rather than
furthering the purposes and operations of the Bank, this waiver
would lay the Bank open to disruptive interference with its employ-
ment policies in each of the thirty-six countries in which it has resi-
dent missions .... 31
While the court noted that many multinational corporations
must conform their employment practices to the laws of various
countries, it recognized the important distinction between private
corporations and international organizations: while private corpora-
tions are organized under the laws of one or more countries, interna-
tional organizations owe their primary allegiance to the principles
and policies established by their organic documents, and not to the
legislation of any one member. 32 Further, the Bank officers and staff
pledge their allegiance to the Bank and to no other authority.33 The
court concluded that in light of this strict neutrality policy and the
obstruction to the Bank's purposes that judicial scrutiny of its em-
ployment practices would cause, no waiver of immunity could be in-
ferred from the Bank's Charter. Thus, the court dismissed
Mendaro's Title VII action for lack of jurisdiction.3 4
The concept of foreign sovereign immunity, which insulates for-
eign sovereigns from otherwise meritorious actions, has existed for
several thousand years. 35 In an early articulation of the doctrine,
Chief Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon stated:
"The jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory is necessarily
exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed
by itself."'36
Gradually, however, as international trade increased, and the
need for security in transactions with foreign governments grew, ab-
solute sovereign immunity began to lose force as a rule of interna-
tional law. By the post-World War II period, few nations granted
29 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 615.
30 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 84 (1965) provides that the "immunity of an international organization . . . may be
waived only by an express waiver on the part of the organization." Id.
31 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 618.
32 Id. at 619.
33 Id. For a discussion of the unique role of the international civil servant, see G.
LANCROD, THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE 82-83 (1963).
34 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 621.
35 See generally Glenn, Immunities of International Organizations, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 247(1981).
36 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
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absolute sovereign immunity.3 7 In 1952 United States policy be-
came aligned with the modern view,3 8 which granted immunity to
official but not commercial acts. The doctrine of "restrictive sover-
eign immunity," codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of
1976 (FSIA),3 9 permits suit based on "commercial activity" against a
sovereign without its consent. Such immunity does not mean that
the holder is above municipal law, only that it is unenforceable
against it; therefore, the holder may waive the immunity and make
the municipal laws binding on it.40
The IOIA grants international organizations the same immuni-
ties as enjoyed by foreign governments if the organizations meet
statutory criteria. 4 ' This immunity is deemed necessary for two rea-
sons: (1) international organizations are composed of sovereign
members whose sovereignty ought to be respected; and (2) freedom
from conflicting municipal laws is necessary for the smooth function-
ing of the organization.42 There are, however, three ways in which
immunity for international organizations may be limited: (1) the or-
ganization itself may waive its immunity; (2) the President may spe-
cifically limit the organization's immunity in the original executive
order; and (3) the immunity is subject to modification, condition, or
revocation by executive order if the privilege is abused. 43 Further-
more, the language of the 1OIA indicates its derivative nature: inter-
national organizations "shall enjoy the same immunity from suit as is
enjoyed by foreign governments. ' 44 Thus, following the restrictive
theory, the immunity of international organizations is limited to offi-
cial, noncommercial activity.
37 See Glenn, supra note 35, at 252-54.
38 The adoption of this theory of restrictive immunity was announced in what has
come to be known as the "Tate Letter;" Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor of
the Department of State, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952),
reprinted in 26 DEP'T OF ST. BULL. 984 (1952). See also Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324
U.S. 30 (1945), in which the court judicially abolished the doctrine of absolute sovereign
immunity.
39 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2-4), 1391(f,
1441(3), 1602-1611 (1982). For a discussion of the effect of the FSIA on the IOIA, see
Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L. J. 1167 (1982).
40 M. AKEHURST, supra note 28, at 118-19. For an example of such a waiver, see Lib-
yan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C.
1980), in which the court held that a Libyan arbitration clause waived the defense of for-
eign sovereign immunity for purposes of federal jurisdiction, but noted that a court must
give particular reasons for denying sovereign immunity and must comply with traditional
requirements for in personam jurisdiction.
41 Immunity is granted to the organization if the United States participates in it pur-
suant to a treaty or congressional act, and if it has been designated by the President as an
international organization. The World Bank has been approved by Congress, 22 U.S.C
§§ 286, 286(h) (1982), and properly designated by the President (Exec. Order No. 9751, 3
C.F.R. 558 (1943-48 Comp.).
42 See M. AKEHURST, THE LAw GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZA-
TIONS 12 (1967).
43 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1982).
44 Id. § 288a(b).
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The distinction between commercial and official activity is not
always easily drawn.45 It is clear that Congress intended the scope of
sovereign immunity to be decided by the courts, rather than the
State Department, because an express purpose of the FSIA was to
dispel the doctrine of judicial deference to the executive on sover-
eign immunity issues. 46
Thus, the courts are empowered to define the scope of sover-
eign immunity by reference to the IOIA, the FSIA, their legislative
histories, and any applicable treaties or charters.47 One commenta-
tor has written that "the courts should limit the category (commer-
cial activity) as narrowly as possible consistent with honoring the
autonomy of the international organizations in the conduct of their
official functions." 48
This immunity is limited traditionally to what is necessary for
the organization to function. 49 Immunity from suit in the courts of
the member states lies at the core of this "functional necessity" con-
cept of sovereign immunity:
[I]f there is one certain principle it is that no member state may hin-
der in any way the working of the organization or take any measures
the effect of which might be to increase its burdens, financial or
other.5 0
When immunity is not necessary to the functioning of the organiza-
tion or in fact impedes it, the organization makes a waiver of immu-
nity for certain actions. 5'
The Mendaro court faced the question whether immunity from
suit by an employee is necessary to the functioning of the World
Bank. In finding immunity necessary, the court followed a tradition
45 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982) defines commercial activity as "either a regular course
of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial
character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct. . . rather than by reference to its purpose." Id. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Aeromex-
ico Inc., 626 F.2d 270 (3rd Cir. 1980) (national airline of Mexico held not immune from
suit because airline was commercial activity).
46 "It [the FSIA] is designed to bring U.S. practice into conformity with that of most
other nations by leaving sovereign immunity decisions exclusively to the courts, thereby
discontinuing the practice ofjudicial deference to 'suggestions of immunity' from the ex-
ecutive branch." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6604, 6610. See, e.g., Exparte Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578 (1943)
(Court defers to executive determination the immunity of a sovereign vessel from a libel
action). For a discussion of the FSIA, see Clarke, The Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1976,
3 NC.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 206, 208-09 (1978). See also O'Toole, Sovereign Immunities
Redivu.s: Suits Against International Organizations, 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ. 1 (1980).
47 Glenn, supra note 35, at 278.
48 O'Toole, supra note 46, at 3.
49 D. BOWETr, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 308 (3d ed. 1975). See also
Curran v. City of New York, 191 Misc. 229, 77 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1947) (rejecting taxpayer's
challenge to United Nation's exemption from city taxes, because the exemption found to
be part of United Nation's immunity, which was necessary to its functioning).
50 Doc. XIII, IV/2, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 703, 704-5 (1945), reprinted in 13 M. WHITE-
MAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 34, 36 (1968).
51 See M. AKEHURST, supra note 28, at 118-19.
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of recognizing the international civil service as ideally unaffected by
competing national policies. Because staff are recruited from all
over the world, a choice of a particular municipal law would be arbi-
trary. Allowing an international civil servant to use his municipal law
would subject the organization to national pressures.52 Further-
more, the multinational personnel are expected to act only in the
interests of their organizations and not their national states. 53 Inter-
national civil servants are said to be governed by the internal author-
ity of their organization rather than the municipal laws of the
member states. 54
Recognizing the importance to international organizations of
immunity from employment suits, American courts have been unwill-
ing to assert jurisdiction over claims by disgruntled international
civil servants. Recently, in Broadbent v. Organization of American States55
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit held that because the relationship between an international or-
ganization and its internal administrative staff is noncommercial, the
organization is thereby immune based on either a restrictive or abso-
lute sovereign immunity. 56 The court stated that "the employment
by a foreign state or international organization of internal adminis-
trative personnel is not properly characterized as 'doing
business.' -57
The Broadbent court relied heavily on the legislative history of
the IOIA, which states that employment of civil service personnel is
stated to be a public, noncommercial activity. 58 In limiting its hold-
ing to a finding that employment of international civil servants is a
noncommercial activity, and therefore does not fall within the excep-
tion provided by the restrictive theory, the Broadbent court evaded
further questions about the extent to which immunity should be
granted to international organizations.
In Tuck v. Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)59 the court
found PAHO immune from suit by Tuck, an employee who had al-
leged tortious interference with contract by the organization. The
court found that Tuck's claims arose out of PAHO's supervision of
its personnel, a noncommercial activity that was protected under the
restrictive immunity theory. 60 Like the Broadbent court, the Tuck
52 M. AKEHURST, supra note 42, at 5.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 628 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
56 Id. at 33.
57 Id.
58 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6615: "Also public or governmental and not commercial in nature
would be the employment of diplomatic, civil service, or military personnel .... "Id.
59 668 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
60 Id. at 550.
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court found it unnecessary to decide whether PAHO possessed abso-
lute or restrictive immunity, concluding that "appellees are in most
respects immune from suit in the district court." 6 1
In Herbert Harvey, Inc. v. NLRB a corporation that managed
maintenance workers in buildings owned by the World Bank asserted
that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had no jurisdiction
over it because of its intimate connection with the World Bank as
employer. 62 The court denied this assertion and upheld the NLRB's
jurisdiction over Herbert Harvey, while recognizing the World
Bank's immunity from the reach of the NLRB.63
In Weidner v. International Telecommunications Satellite Organization
(Intelstat)6 4 the court held Intelstat immune from a breach of contract
suit, even though it had not been designated as an international or-
ganization at the time the cause of action arose. Established in 1973,
Intelstat was designated an international organization by President
Ford in January 197765 after its alleged wrongful dismissal of plain-
tiff six weeks before the filing of the complaint. The court found the
operative date was the date the complaint was filed, and dismissed
plaintiff's argument that there is a distinction between immunities
extended to foreign governments and those extended to interna-
tional organizations. 66
The Mendaro court was thus faced with a seemingly impenetrable
body of case law that excluded international civil servants from ac-
tions against their employers in American courts. A reading of this
case law, the relevant statutes, and the legislative history indicates
that the Mendaro decision, although problematic, is defensible. The
denial of equal protection to an employee working within the United
States is a troubling application of sovereign immunity. Although
the Mendaro court was sympathetic to plaintiffs plight,67 it was un-
able or unwilling to search beyond the present application of the law
to find a remedy.
Unlike sovereign immunity, which is derived from the common
law (later codified in its restrictive form in the FSIA), the immunity of
international organizations is statutory. Before the enactment of the
1OIA, no provision was made for jurisdictional immunity of interna-
61 Id.
62 424 F.2d 770 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
63 See id. at 773 n.20 in which the court cites the proposition that "the Bank enjoys
certain privileges and immunities. Thus, the governors, directors, officers, and employees
of the Bank are immune from legal process for acts performed in their official capacities
.
. Id.
64 392 A.2d 508 (D.C. 1978).
65 Exec. Order No. 11,966, 42 Fed. Reg. 4331 (1977).
66 Weidner, 392 A.2d at 511. The court hints, however, that it sees some merit to this
argument: "Even if Congress intended for there to be such a distinction when they en-
acted the [IOIA] in 1945, it is unclear what the differences in the immunities are." Id.
67 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 616 n.41.
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tional organizations or their personnel, 6 8 although international or-
ganizations were recognized as legal personalities vulnerable to
suit.6 9 The IOIA was a congressional grant of immunity intended to
facilitate the functioning of international organizations.7 0 The im-
munity is given to a specific international organization by executive
order and can be revoked by executive order if abused. 7 1 Unlike the
FSIA, which clearly intends that questions of immunity be decided by
the courts, rather than the executive branch, 72 the IOIA vests consid-
erable power in the President to set limits on international organiza-
tion immunity.
The State Department clearly views the grant of immunity to in-
ternational organizations as a privilege of national law rather than a
privilege inherent in customary international law. The Department
has asserted that the privileges and immunities granted to public in-
ternational organizations impose a special responsibility on them
and their member states to provide effective methods of addressing
and resolving labor-management disputes. 7 3 This view, coupled
with the power vested in the executive to revoke international orga-
nizations immunity indicates that international organizations may
not run roughshod over the rights of their employees. The courts
traditionally have been willing to grant immunity from employment
suits to international organizations; yet given a directive from the
executive branch, they would not be compelled to grant such
immunity.
There is a considerable body of international organization inter-
nal administrative law, which began to develop in the late 1920s in
the League of Nations.74 A common law for international civil ser-
vants has emerged, based largely on the principles of the best estab-
lished municipal systems. 75 The character of employment in
international organizations necessitates the development of a corpus
juris unique to each international organization, because these organi-
zations are established under, and governed by, their constitutions
or charters. 7 6 Recognizing the need for internal administrative law,
most international organizations have internal administrative tribu-
68 Note, Jurisdictional Immunities of Intergovernmental Organizations, 91 YALE L.J. 1167,
1168 (1982).
69 Preuss, The International Organizations Immunities Act, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 332, 333-34
(1946).
70 Congress also considered the possibility that the United Nations would establish
headquarters in the United States. See H.R. REP. No. 1203, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
71 22 U.S.C. § 288 (1982).
72 Id.
73 PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, Ch. 2, § 4B.
74 M. AKEHURST, supra note 42, at 4-6.
75 See A. PLANTEY, supra note 28, § 141.
76 M. AKEHURST, supra note 42, at 5. See also Morgenstern, The Law Applicable to Inter-
national Officials, 18 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 739 (1969), for a discussion of the problems inher-
ent in this body of law.
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nals or staff associations for the establishment of staff regulations
and the resolution of internal grievances. 77 Internal administrative
tribunals cannot render binding judgments, but can only make rec-
ommendations to the Secretariat. 78 At a minimum, the existence of
an internal administrative tribunal provides a forum for airing em-
ployee grievances.
When Mendaro's cause of action arose, the World Bank did not
have an internal administrative tribunal. 79 The World Bank had be-
gun as a small group of highly-trained professionals and specialists.
In the last twenty years, the staff has increased sixfold, to over six
thousand.80 No longer a tight-knit group of professionals, the World
Bank had become a large international organization with no internal
tribunal for employee grievances.
The World Bank finally established an internal administrative
tribunal in April 1980 for two reasons: (1) management recognized
the importance of some grievance procedure for staff morale; and
(2) lack ofjudicial guarantees to Bank employees might be viewed as
a factor by some national courts in deciding to assert jurisdiction. 8'
The World Bank's tribunal was established too late for Mendaro.8 2
She was left remediless by an international organization with inade-
quate staff regulations and grievance procedures, and by a municipal
court that refused to pierce the veil of immunity of international or-
ganizations or even, through dicta, to call upon the executive to take
note of the wrongdoing.
Mendaro is significant, not for its reiteration of case law denying
jurisdiction over employment claims by employees of international
organizations, but for its refusal to recognize fully the conditional
nature of international organizations immunity.8 3 The court sympa-
thized with Mendaro, because her claim concerned a particularly
egregious offense. 84 Yet it was unwilling to examine seriously the
functional necessity argument for blanket immunity of international
organizations in employment disputes and the procedure for redress
of employee grievances. Furthermore, the court refused to impose
legal responsibility on an organization that is granted immunity by
77 M. AKEHURST, supra note 42, at 11-26. For a discussion of the development of
administrative tribunals in international organizations, seeJ. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
SERVICE: PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 189-206 (1958).
78 M. AKEHURST, supra note 42, at 12.
79 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 616 n.41.
80 Arechaga, The New Administrative Tribunal of the World Bank, 14J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 2
(1981).
81 Id. at 1-6.
82 The tribunal was vested with only limited retroactive jurisdiction, which did not
extend to the time when Mendaro's cause of action arose. Also, it was not explicitly au-
thorized to resolve claims based on sexual harassment. Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 616 n.41.
83 The court referred to this conditional nature early in the discussion of the IOA,
but never discussed it substantively.
84 Mendaro, 717 F.2d at 616 n.41.
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statute and retains it at the pleasure of the executive. The court le-
gally may not have been able to assert jurisdiction over the World
Bank in Mendaro, but strong dicta about the Bank's responsibility to
its employees and the ability of the executive to remove the immu-
nity would have been a useful prod to international organizations
with inadequate adminstrative tribunals.
-FRANCES WRIGHT HENDERSON

